
Climate Inaction and Human Rights: The ECtHR's Cautious Approach in De Conto and Uricchio v. Italy and Others
As climate litigation spreads across Europe, the European Court of Human Rights ("ECtHR") is increasingly asked to evaluate whether insufficient climate action by States may violate the rights enshrined in the European Convention on Human Rights. In the recent decisions De Conto v. Italy and 32 Others and Uricchio v. Italy and 31 Others (ECtHR, 7 May 2025, applications nos. 14620/21 and 14615/21), the court reaffirmed that while such claims are not excluded in principle, the evidentiary burden remains high.
Both applicants—Italian nationals—claimed that the effects of climate change had seriously impacted their health and well-being, and that these consequences resulted from the failure of Italy and more than 30 States, including France, to take adequate action to mitigate climate risks. They alleged that this inaction amounted to violations of Article 2 (right to life) and Article 8 (right to respect for private and family life), as well as Article 13 (right to an effective remedy) and Article 14 (prohibition of discrimination).
Ms. De Conto pointed to psychological distress linked to events, such as the 2018 "Vaia Storm" (intense Mediterranean storm which brought severe conditions to Northern Italy and surrounding regions), submitting medical reports diagnosing impulse control disorder, antisocial personality disorder, and eating disorders. She described heightened anxiety when facing climate-related disasters and a deep sense of fear about the future. Ms. Uricchio, residing in Southern Italy, described respiratory issues, rashes, sleep disturbances, and recurring nightmares, especially after experiencing a major flood in 2019.
The court first confirmed that only Italy could be held accountable, as no extraterritorial jurisdiction could be established over the other States. It relied on Duarte Agostinho and Others v. Portugal and 32 Others (ECtHR, GC, 9 April 2024, no. 39371/20), in which it clarified the limits of jurisdiction under Article 1 of the Convention. It therefore proceeded to assess the applications solely against Italy.
Applying the criteria defined in Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz and Others v. Switzerland (ECtHR, GC, 9 April 2024, no. 53600/20), the court reiterated that individual victim status in the climate context requires: (i) a high intensity of exposureto the adverse effects of climate change; and (ii) a pressing need to ensure individual protection. It emphasized that the threshold is particularly high.
In both cases, the court found these conditions unmet. While Ms. De Conto provided medical documentation, none of the reports linked her conditions to climate change or evidenced severe anxiety directly attributable to it. Ms. Uricchio, for her part, failed to submit any medical evidence at all. The court concluded that neither applicant had shown individualized exposure or risk sufficient to justify victim status under Article 8, nor had they substantiated a real and imminent risk to life under Article 2.
As a result, both applications were declared inadmissible ratione personae under Article 35 §3. The additional claims under Articles 13 and 14 were similarly dismissed as unsubstantiated.
These decisions confirm that while the ECtHR has not excluded the possibility of successful climate-based human rights claims, it insists on a high standard of proof, grounded in personal, individualized, and preferably medical or scientific evidence. General climate concerns, even if legitimate and urgent, are not enough.
De Conto and Uricchio signal that climate litigation before the ECtHR must meet strict admissibility criteria—but also that the legal path remains open.
The ECtHR's insistence on individualized harm and a high evidentiary threshold in De Conto and Uricchio stands in marked contrast to the broader legal obligations affirmed by the International Court of Justice ("ICJ") in its landmark 2025 advisory opinion on climate change. In that opinion, the ICJ concluded that States may bear international responsibility for failing to adequately regulate GHG emissions, framing climate inaction as a potential internationally wrongful act. Unlike the ECtHR, which adjudicates individual claims under the European Convention on Human Rights and requires concrete evidence of personal harm, the ICJ focused on States' due diligence obligations under customary international law, climate treaties (like the Paris Agreement), and international human rights law. It emphasized that nationally determined contributions must be ambitious, progressive, and stringently implemented. Crucially, the ICJ recognized a direct link between States' climate obligations and the protection of human rights, but without conditioning that recognition on individual victim status or medical proof. Taken together, these decisions reflect two distinct but complementary paths: one rooted in individual access to justice, the other in clarifying States' systemic legal responsibilities.
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