UK Government Proposes Targeted Reforms to the Competition Redress and Enforcement Landscape

On 17 July 2026, the Department for Business and Trade published proposed reforms to the UK regimes for competition opt-out collective actions, regulatory appeals and Competition Act 1998 enforcement. Responses to the consultation are due by 25 September 2026.

Collective Actions Reforms

The current collective actions regime allows a single claim for breach of competition law to be brought before the Competition Appeal Tribunal ("CAT") on behalf of a class of individuals or companies who have suffered the same loss. Class members are automatically included unless they opt out. Although the government is not currently proposing to expand or narrow the regime's scope, it is seeking views on a wide range of procedural and funding changes.

The proposed reforms are principally aimed at protecting businesses from unmeritorious and disproportionately expensive claims, while preserving access to redress for genuinely harmed claimants. They also seek to make the litigation process faster, simpler and less costly for both the CAT and the parties, while ensuring that alleged victims of anticompetitive conduct receive a greater share of any damages award or settlement sum.

The proposed reforms to collective actions procedures and funding rules are wide-ranging:

• Requirements for certification, which must be met before a collective action can proceed, would be toughened. Under the proposed reforms, the certification threshold would shift from a relative to an absolute assessment of a claim's suitability. Filing fees calculated by reference to the sum claimed would also be introduced.
  
  
• Funding arrangements would face greater scrutiny from the outset of proceedings. In addition, damages-based funding agreements, which are currently prohibited in opt-out actions, would be permitted.
  
  
• All parties would be required to prepare costs budgets following certification, combined with the introduction of sanctions for conduct that unreasonably inflates costs.
  
  
• Settlement would be actively encouraged: The CAT would gain new powers to compel mediation, and a mechanism would be introduced allowing settlement offers to carry automatic cost-shifting consequences.
  
  
• Finally, Type A leniency applicants (the first parties to report a cartel) would be granted civil immunity from damages claims, reinforcing the incentive to come forward early.

Regulatory Appeal Reforms

Decisions by economic regulators, including the Water Services Regulation Authority, the Civil Aviation Authority and the Office of Communications (referred to respectively as Ofwat, CAA and Ofcom), are currently subject to several different UK appeals systems. The proposals seek to simplify this by harmonising three key elements: the deciding body, the standard applied and the eligibility criteria for appeals.

Although some appeals are heard by the CAT or UK courts, as is more typical internationally, a significant proportion are currently determined by the United Kingdom's competition authority, the Competition and Markets Authority ("CMA"). The consultation seeks views on transferring this responsibility to the CAT, consolidating regulatory appeals before a single judicial body and freeing up CMA enforcement resources.

The proposals also address the variation in appeal and eligibility standards across regimes, seeking views both on a uniform appeal standard that would apply regardless of sector and on a single right of appeal harmonising sector-specific eligibility criteria. Under the proposed reforms, the CAT would decide any appeals by applying judicial review principles while also having the ability to admit new evidence and cross-examine witnesses.

Competition Enforcement Reforms

Finally, the consultation proposes several reforms aimed at improving the efficiency of CMA enforcement. Key proposals include:

• Removing the requirement for a two-tier decision-making structure that involves a Senior Responsible Officer and a separate case decision group in favour of allowing the CMA to define its own decision-making model through guidance. This would mirror the approach already taken for the CMA's direct consumer protection powers. A similar approach would apply to settlement cases.
  
  
• Simplifying confidentiality requirements by removing the CMA's current obligation, applicable in every case, to seek representations before disclosing information that is claimed to be confidential.
  
  
• Streamlining access to evidence through a standardised legal framework for confidentiality rings and reduced access-to-file obligations in settlement and interim measures cases.
  
  
• Tightening settlement procedures by requiring parties to agree not to appeal as a condition of settlement and removing the need to issue a statement of objections in certain pre-settlement cases.
  
  
• Refining the rules on competition disqualification orders to capture overseas director conduct.
  
  
• Introducing a fixed penalty cap of up to £300,000 (approximately US$403,000) for undertakings with no, or unrepresentative, turnover.

Some of these competition enforcement reforms, particularly those related to settlement, are designed to convert existing CMA practice into binding rules. Others, such as those concerned with access-to-file and confidentiality protections, are material changes that could risk favouring efficiency over procedural protections for defendants.

If implemented, the proposed three categories of reforms would curb excessive costs in collective actions, reduce complexity in the appeals and enforcement process and streamline procedures across the redress and enforcement landscape—a welcome recalibration for businesses that regularly find themselves defending such claims.