Chapter 15 Update: U.S. Bankruptcy Court Refuses to Enforce Order Approving Indonesian Debt Restructuring Plan Due to Third-Party Releases
Cross-border bankruptcy cases filed in the U.S. under chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code on behalf of foreign businesses doubled during 2020 and are on pace to set another record-breaking year in 2021 (with more than 123 filings in the first half of the year alone). Foreign debtors are increasingly looking to chapter 15 as a vehicle for enjoining creditor actions against their U.S. assets pending completion of foreign bankruptcy proceedings, enforcing foreign court orders issued or plans approved in such proceedings, avoiding preferential and fraudulent transfers involving U.S. transferees, and seeking discovery from U.S.-based parties in connection with pending or anticipated litigation.
As an application of international comity, "recognition" under chapter 15 of foreign restructuring proceedings and enforcement of foreign court orders issued in connection with such proceedings have become almost routine during the more than 15 years that chapter 15 has been in force. Even so, a recent ruling handed down by the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York illustrates that recognition and enforcement is not assured in every case. In In re PT Bakrie Telecom TBK, 2021 WL 1439953 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Apr. 15, 2021), the bankruptcy court entered an order recognizing an Indonesian "suspension of payments proceeding" under chapter 15. However, the court refused to grant a foreign representative's request for "additional relief" in the form of enforcement of an Indonesian court order approving a restructuring plan because the order included third-party releases (a non-standard practice under Indonesian law). According to the court, there was "nothing in the record about the justification for any third-party release" or any indication "the foreign court considered the rights of creditors when considering this third-party release."
Procedures, Recognition, and Relief Under Chapter 15
Chapter 15 was enacted in 2005 to govern cross-border bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings. It is patterned on the 1997 UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency ("Model Law"), which has been enacted in some form by more than 50 countries.
Both chapter 15 and the Model Law are premised upon the principle of international comity, or "the recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard both to international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens or of other persons who are under the protection of its laws." Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 164 (1895). Chapter 15's stated purpose is "to provide effective mechanisms for dealing with cases of cross-border insolvency" with the objective of, among other things, cooperation between U.S. and non-U.S. courts.
Under section 1515 of the Bankruptcy Code, the representative of a foreign debtor may file a petition in a U.S. bankruptcy court seeking "recognition" of a "foreign proceeding." Section 101(24) of the Bankruptcy Code defines "foreign representative" as "a person or body, including a person or body appointed on an interim basis, authorized in a foreign proceeding to administer the reorganization or the liquidation of the debtor's assets or affairs or to act as a representative of such foreign proceeding."
"Foreign proceeding" is defined in section 101(23) of the Bankruptcy Code as:
[A] collective judicial or administrative proceeding in a foreign country, including an interim proceeding, under a law relating to insolvency or adjustment of debt in which proceeding the assets and affairs of the debtor are subject to control or supervision by a foreign court, for the purpose of reorganization or liquidation.
More than one bankruptcy or insolvency proceeding may be pending with respect to the same foreign debtor in different countries. Chapter 15 therefore contemplates recognition in the United States of both a foreign "main" proceeding—a case pending in the country where the debtor's center of main interests ("COMI") is located (see 11 U.S.C. § 1502(4))—and foreign "nonmain" proceedings, which may be pending in countries where the debtor merely has an "establishment." See 11 U.S.C. § 1502(5). A debtor's COMI is presumed to be the location of the debtor's registered office, or habitual residence in the case of an individual. See 11 U.S.C. § 1516(c). An "establishment" is defined by section 1502(2) as "any place of operations where the debtor carries out a nontransitory economic activity."
Upon recognition of a foreign "main" proceeding, section 1520(a) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that certain provisions of the Bankruptcy Code automatically come into force, including: (i) the automatic stay preventing creditor collection efforts with respect to the debtor or its U.S. assets (section 362, subject to certain enumerated exceptions); (ii) the right of any entity asserting an interest in the debtor's U.S. assets to "adequate protection" of that interest (section 361); and (iii) restrictions on use, sale, lease, transfer, or encumbrance of the debtor's U.S. assets (sections 363, 549, and 552).
Following recognition of a main or nonmain proceeding, section 1521(a) provides that, to the extent not already in effect, and "where necessary to effectuate the purpose of [chapter 15] and to protect the assets of the debtor or the interests of the creditors," the bankruptcy court may grant "any appropriate relief," including a stay of any action against the debtor or its U.S. assets not covered by the automatic stay, an order suspending the debtor's right to transfer or encumber its U.S. assets, and "any additional relief that may be available to a trustee," with certain exceptions. Under section 1521(b), the court may entrust the distribution of the debtor's U.S. assets to the foreign representative or another person, provided the court is satisfied that the interests of U.S. creditors are "sufficiently protected."
Section 1507 of the Bankruptcy Code provides that, upon recognition of a main or nonmain proceeding, the bankruptcy court may provide "additional assistance" to a foreign representative "under [the Bankruptcy Code] or under other laws of the United States." However, any such assistance must, "consistent with principles of comity," reasonably ensure that: (i) all stakeholders are treated fairly; (ii) U.S. creditors are not prejudiced or inconvenienced by asserting their claims in the foreign proceeding; (iii) the debtor's assets are not preferentially or fraudulently transferred; (iv) proceeds of the debtor's assets are distributed substantially in accordance with the order prescribed by the Bankruptcy Code; and (v) if appropriate, an individual foreign debtor is given the opportunity for a fresh start. See 11 U.S.C. § 1507(b).
Section 1522(a) provides that the bankruptcy court may exercise its discretion to order any of the relief authorized by chapter 15 upon the commencement of a case or recognition of a foreign proceeding "only if the interests of the creditors and other interested entities, including the debtor, are sufficiently protected."
Finally, section 1506 sets forth a public policy exception to the relief otherwise authorized in chapter 15, providing that "[n]othing in this chapter prevents the court from refusing to take an action governed by this chapter if the action would be manifestly contrary to the public policy of the United States." However, section 1506 requires a "narrow reading" and "does not create an exception for any action under Chapter 15 that may conflict with public policy, but only an action that is 'manifestly contrary.'" In re Fairfield Sentry Ltd., 714 F.3d 127, 139 (2d Cir. 2013) (emphasis in original).
Validity of Nonconsensual Third-Party Releases in Chapter 11 Plans Under U.S. Law
The circuit courts of appeals are split as to whether a bankruptcy court has the authority to approve chapter 11 plan provisions in a non-asbestos case that, over the objection of creditors or other stakeholders, release specified non-debtors from liability or enjoin dissenting stakeholders from asserting claims against such non-debtors. The minority view, held by the Fifth and Tenth Circuits—and until 2020, arguably the Ninth Circuit (see below)—bans such nonconsensual releases on the basis that they are prohibited by section 524(e) of the Bankruptcy Code, which provides generally that "discharge of a debt of the debtor does not affect the liability of any other entity on, or the property of any other entity for, such debt." See In re Pac. Lumber Co., 584 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2009); In re Lowenschuss, 67 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir. 1995); In re W. Real Estate Fund, Inc., 922 F.2d 592 (10th Cir. 1990). But see Blixseth v. Credit Suisse, 961 F.3d 1074, 1083-84 (9th Cir. 2020) (suggesting, contrary to Lowenschuss and other previous rulings, that section 524(e) does not preclude certain non-debtor plan releases of claims that are not based on the debt discharged by the plan).
By contrast, the majority of the circuits that have considered the issue have found such releases and injunctions permissible under certain circumstances. See In re Seaside Eng'g & Surveying, Inc., 780 F.3d 1070 (11th Cir. 2015); In re Airadigm Commc'ns, Inc., 519 F.3d 640 (7th Cir. 2008); In re Dow Corning Corp., 280 F.3d 648 (6th Cir. 2002); In re Drexel Burnham Lambert Grp., Inc., 960 F.2d 285 (2d Cir. 1992); In re A.H. Robins Co., Inc., 880 F.2d 694 (4th Cir. 1989). For authority, these courts generally rely on section 105(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, which authorizes courts to "issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of [the Bankruptcy Code]." Moreover, as the Seventh Circuit held in Airadigm, the majority view is that section 524(e) does not limit a bankruptcy court's authority to grant such releases. Airadigm, 519 F.3d at 656 ("If Congress meant to include such a limit, it would have used the mandatory terms 'shall' or 'will' rather than the definitional term 'does.' And it would have omitted the prepositional phrase 'on, or … for, such debt,' ensuring that the 'discharge of a debt of the debtor shall not affect the liability of another entity'—whether related to a debt or not.").
Some courts have also relied, as authority for involuntary releases, on section 1123(b)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code, which provides that a chapter 11 plan may "include any other appropriate provision not inconsistent with the applicable provisions of [the Bankruptcy Code]." See Airadigm, 519 F.3d at 657; In re Scrub Island Dev. Grp. Ltd., 523 B.R. 862, 875 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2015).
The First and D.C. Circuits have suggested that they agree with the "pro-release" majority. See In re Monarch Life Ins. Co., 65 F.3d 973 (1st Cir. 1995) (a debtor's subsidiary was collaterally estopped by a plan confirmation order from belatedly challenging the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court to permanently enjoin lawsuits against the debtor's attorneys and other non-debtors not contributing to the debtor's reorganization); In re AOV Indus., 792 F.2d 1140 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (a plan provision releasing liabilities of non-debtors was unfair because the plan did not provide additional compensation to a creditor whose claim against the non-debtor was being released; adequate consideration must be provided to a creditor forced to release claims against non-debtors).
In In re Millennium Lab Holdings II, LLC, 945 F.3d 126, 129 (3d Cir. 2019), the Third Circuit refrained from "broadly sanctioning the permissibility of nonconsensual third-party releases in bankruptcy reorganization plans" but, based on the "specific, exceptional facts of this case," upheld a lower court decision confirming a chapter 11 plan containing nonconsensual third-party releases, finding that the order confirming the plan did not violate Article III of the U.S. Constitution.
Majority-view courts employ various tests to determine whether such releases are appropriate. Factors generally considered by courts evaluating third-party plan releases or injunctions include whether they are essential to the reorganization, whether the parties being released have made or are making a substantial financial contribution to the reorganization, and whether affected creditors overwhelmingly support the plan. See Dow Corning, 280 F.3d at 658 (listing factors).
Even courts in the majority camp acknowledge that nonconsensual plan releases should be approved only in rare or usual cases. See Seaside Eng'g, 780 F.3d at 1078; Nat'l Heritage Found., Inc. v. Highbourne Found., 760 F.3d 344, 347-50 (4th Cir. 2014); Behrmann v. Nat'l Heritage Found., 663 F.3d 704, 712 (4th Cir. 2011); In re Metromedia Fiber Network, Inc., 416 F.3d 136, 141-43 (2d Cir. 2005).
Recognition and Enforcement of Non-Debtor Releases in Chapter 15 Cases
In a chapter 15 case, unlike in a chapter 11 case, a U.S. bankruptcy court is not asked to confirm a plan of reorganization or liquidation. However, the court may be asked to recognize and enforce a plan, composition with creditors, scheme of arrangement, or court order sanctioned or issued by a foreign court presiding over a foreign debtor's main proceeding. Such a plan or order may enjoin creditors from suing or otherwise proceeding against parties other than the foreign debtor. In such a case, whether a release or injunction should be enforced by a U.S. bankruptcy court is a more nuanced issue.
For example, in In re Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments, 421 B.R. 685 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010), U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Martin Glenn, to provide "additional assistance" in a chapter 15 case involving a Canadian debtor, enforced a Canadian court's order confirming a restructuring plan that contained non-debtor releases and injunctions, even though it was uncertain whether a U.S. court would have approved the releases and injunctions in a case under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. Judge Glenn reasoned that such uncertainty was of little consequence in the case before him, which involved not the propriety of non-debtor injunctions and releases in a plenary bankruptcy case but, rather, a request to enforce a foreign judgment in a chapter 15 case. The court concluded that "principles of enforcement of foreign judgments and comity in chapter 15 cases strongly counsel approval of enforcement in the United States of the third-party non-debtor release and injunction provisions included in the Canadian Orders, even if those provisions could not be entered in a plenary chapter 11 case." Id. at 696.
By contrast, in Vitro S.A.B. de C.V. v. ACP Master, Ltd. (In re Vitro S.A.B. de C.V.), 473 B.R. 117 (Bankr. N.D. Tex.), aff'd, 701 F.3d 1031 (5th Cir. 2012), the bankruptcy court ruled that releases of non-debtor affiliates included in a Mexican debtor's reorganization plan were unenforceable as contrary to U.S. public policy. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ruled that the prohibition of such releases under Fifth Circuit precedent (citing Pac. Lumber) did not necessarily mean that a U.S. bankruptcy court could not enforce them under section 1507 as a permissible form of "additional assistance" not otherwise available under the Bankruptcy Code or U.S. law.
However, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to enforce the nonconsensual releases where affected creditors were not given any alternative means to recover and would receive only a tiny fraction of what was owed to them, and where the votes in favor of the Mexican debtor's reorganization plan comprised largely insider votes (which are not counted as acceptances under chapter 11 pursuant to section 1129(a)(10) of the Bankruptcy Code). Because it concluded that relief was not warranted under section 1507 and would not be available under section 1521, the Fifth Circuit did "not reach whether the [Mexican reorganization] plan would be manifestly contrary to a fundamental public policy of the United States" within the meaning of section 1506. Id. at 1070.
In In re Sino-Forest Corp., 501 B.R. 655 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2013), Judge Glenn employed a similar rationale as in Metcalfe in recognizing and enforcing as a form of "additional assistance" under section 1507 a Canadian court-approved settlement containing a global release provision. In addition, he noted that, in the Second Circuit, "where the third-party releases are not categorically prohibited, it cannot be argued that the issuance of such releases is manifestly contrary to public policy" within the meaning of section 1506. Id. at 655 (citing In re Metromedia Fiber Network, Inc., 416 F.3d 136, 141 (2d Cir. 2005)).
In In re Avanti Commc'ns Grp. PLC, 582 B.R. 603 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2018), Judge Glenn entered an order under chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code enforcing a scheme of arrangement sanctioned by a court in England that included nonconsensual third-party releases. Judge Glenn determined that such releases should be recognized and enforced consistent with principles of "comity" and cooperation with foreign courts inherent under chapter 15.
After examining the requirements of sections 1507 and 1521 of the Bankruptcy Code, Judge Glenn concluded, among other things, that: (i) affected creditors were afforded due process consistent with U.S. standards; (ii) third-party non-debtor releases, particularly for affiliate guarantors of debt adjusted by a scheme of arrangement, are common under English law (and are often enforced in the Second Circuit in chapter 15 proceedings); and (iii) if the scheme were not recognized and enforced in the chapter 15 case, creditors could be prejudiced and the ruling could "prevent the fair and efficient administration of the [r]estructuring."
Judge Glenn distinguished Vitro. In particular, he pointed out that the Mexican reorganization plan in Vitro was supported by a significant number of insider votes, in contrast to Avanti, where the scheme received essentially unanimous consent from all impaired creditors.
In In re Agrokor d.d., 591 B.R. 163 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2018), Judge Glenn enforced a settlement agreement containing a third-party release approved by creditors in a Croatian restructuring proceeding even though it restructured English-law debt in violation of the "Gibbs Rule." Unlike in Vitro, Judge Glenn reasoned, the settlement agreement (and release) in Agrokor was approved by substantially more than the two-third threshold required under Croatian law, excluding "insider" affiliate votes.
PT Bakrie Telecom Tbk ("BTEL") is an Indonesian telecommunications company. Prior to 2013, BTEL guaranteed $380 million of senior unsecured notes issued by a wholly owned subsidiary ("issuer"), which loaned the proceeds of the note offering to BTEL. The issuer then assigned its rights against BTEL to the trustee under a note indenture ("indenture trustee") governed by New York law with a New York forum selection clause.
BTEL and the issuer subsidiary defaulted on the notes beginning in 2013. Three noteholders sued BTEL and certain other defendants in a New York state court in September 2014, seeking to collect on the notes and the guarantee.
In September 2014, the noteholders filed a second lawsuit in New York state court against BTEL and certain other defendants alleging fraud and other tortious conduct in connection with the note offering. The state court consolidated the two suits and ruled in favor of the noteholders on the breach of contract and fraud claims, but it dismissed certain other claims. That ruling was affirmed in part on appeal, and the case was remanded to the lower court for additional discovery.
In October 2014, another BTEL creditor commenced a suspension of payments proceeding on BTEL's behalf in Indonesia's Central Jakarta Commercial Court ("Jakarta court"). After the Jakarta court appointed administrators in the proceeding, the requisite majority of BTEL's creditors (a majority in number and two-thirds in value) voted in favor of BTEL's restructuring plan. However, of the creditors approving the plan, the issuer held 56% of the unsecured debt restructured by the plan, and the remaining 324 accepting unsecured creditors held 38.6% of the debt.
The noteholders' claims were not recognized in the proceeding because BTEL, in its statutorily required "record and report," listed the issuer, rather than the noteholders or the indenture trustee, as its creditor with respect to the $380 million debt. BTEL claimed that it did so because the noteholders were not the registered "holders" of the notes until February 2015. At a meeting of creditors, the administrators disallowed the indenture trustee's filed claim on that basis.
After considering the parties' arguments on the issue and reviewing BTEL's record and report, the Jakarta court verified the administrators' decision and granted the issuer the right to vote. The Jakarta court approved BTEL's restructuring plan in December 2014. Neither the indenture trustee nor the noteholders appealed or otherwise challenged the confirmation order. The Supreme Court of Indonesia denied an appeal of the order filed by a government ministry, after which the Jakarta proceeding concluded. Like the Jakarta court, the Supreme Court relied on the claims register set forth in the record and report in denying the appeal.
In December 2017—three years after confirmation of BTEL's restructuring plan—BTEL executed a declaration appointing Jastiro Abi ("Abi"), a director of BTEL and the issuer subsidiary at the time of the note offering, as its foreign representative for the purpose of seeking recognition of the Jakarta proceeding under chapter 15. Abi filed a chapter 15 petition in the Southern District of New York in January 2018. Shortly afterward, BTEL and the other defendants in the state court litigation stipulated to the entry of a judgment in favor of the noteholders in the amount of approximately $160 million. However, the noteholders agreed not to enforce the judgment pending resolution of BTEL's chapter 15 case.
The noteholders moved for summary judgment denying recognition of the Jakarta proceeding under chapter 15. Among other things, they argued that: (i) the appointment of Abi as BTEL's foreign representative was invalid; and (ii) BTEL's chapter 15 petition must be denied because the Jakarta proceeding was not collective, and recognition would be manifestly contrary to U.S. public policy.
In 2019, the bankruptcy court denied the noteholders' motion for summary judgment, citing unresolved questions of fact regarding a number of issues. Among other things, the court concluded that: (i) although the delay in seeking chapter 15 relief after a foreign proceeding has been closed alone did not preclude a finding that a foreign representative was properly appointed, the significance of the delay in this case was a matter for trial; (ii) whether Abi's appointment complied with sections 101(24), 1515, and 1517 of the Bankruptcy Code, rather than Indonesian law, had to be decided at trial; (iii) there were questions of fact involving the administrators' consideration of the noteholders' claims, the independence of the administrators and the Jakarta court, and whether BTEL's restructuring plan would have been rejected if the indenture trustee had been permitted to vote; and (iv) factual questions precluded summary judgment under the "narrowly construed" public policy exception stated in section 1506. See In re PT Bakrie Telecom Tbk, 601 B.R. 707 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2019).
After trial at the end of 2019, the bankruptcy court issued its ruling on these issues.
The Bankruptcy Court's Ruling
Initially, U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Sean Lane reiterated his conclusion that Abi's appointment as BTEL's foreign representative for the purpose of filing a chapter 15 petition was not invalid even though it occurred three years after the Jakarta proceeding had been closed. The record, he explained, reflected that the timing of Abi's appointment was based on "practical considerations," including BTEL's hope that it might prevail in the state court litigation, in which case a chapter 15 filing would have been unnecessary.
Next, Judge Lane ruled that the Jakarta proceeding qualified as a "collective" proceeding, as required by section 101(23) of the Bankruptcy Code, substantially for the reasons previously articulated in his order denying the noteholders' summary judgment motion. According to Judge Lane, the Jakarta proceeding was collective because "'the rights and obligations of all creditors' were considered by the foreign court" (quoting In re Ashapura Minechem Ltd., 480 B.R. 129, 136 and 140 (S.D.N.Y. 2012)).
Judge Lane accordingly held that the Jakarta proceeding should be recognized under chapter 15 as a foreign main proceeding.
However, he denied Abi's request for an order enforcing the order approving BTEL's restructuring plan in the United States because it included a provision that was tantamount to a third-party release of claims relating to the notes.
Judge Lane explained that relief under section 1521(a) may be granted only if the "interests of the creditors and other interested entities, including the debtor, are sufficiently protected." Similarly, he noted section 1507(b) conditions "additional assistance" on a showing that such relief "will reasonably assure … just treatment of all holders of claims against or interests in the debtor's property" and the protection of U.S. creditors against prejudice and inconvenience in asserting their claims in a foreign proceeding. Finally, Judge Lane emphasized that a bankruptcy court should defer to a foreign bankruptcy proceeding on international comity grounds only if that proceeding does not violate the laws or public policy of the U.S. and abides by "fundamental standards of procedural fairness."
According to Judge Lane, "there is no clear and formal record that sets forth whether or how the foreign court considered the rights of creditors when considering this third party release," as required in evaluating comity by the Supreme Court's decision in Hilton. Nor, he wrote, was there anything "in the record about the justification for any third-party release." In the absence of any evidence by Abi on these points—which Judge Lane invited the parties to develop after returning to the Jakarta court—Judge Lane ruled that any relief under sections 1507 and 1521 must be denied.
Judge Lane emphasized that his decision on this point "is not a ruling on the permissible scope of third-party releases under Indonesian law," noting, moreover, that releases in a foreign proceeding need not be identical to those that a U.S. court would approve in a chapter 11 case.
In light of his ruling, Judge Lane declined to decide whether, as an insider, the issuer's decisive role in accepting the BTIF's restructuring plan should bar the additional relief of enforcing the plan. He noted, however, that Abi failed to submit any evidence, including the record and report, of the basis for the foreign courts' decisions on the legitimacy of the issuer's disputed voting right—an issue that might be revisited if Abi remedied the other deficiencies in his request for additional relief.
Finally, Judge Lane noted that the noteholders failed to provide any evidence that the Jakarta proceeding was tainted by corruption or of anything else that would satisfy the "high standard" applied to the "public policy" exception in section 1506.
As Judge Lane was careful to note, his ruling in PT Bakrie is in no way a criticism of Indonesian restructuring proceedings or Indonesian law in the context of recognition under chapter 15 as an exercise of international comity. In fact, the court concluded that chapter 15 recognition was justified in this case, observing that many other courts have also recognized Indonesian proceedings. In so ruling, the court reaffirmed the role that U.S. bankruptcy courts, guided by chapter 15, play in cross-border bankruptcy cases. Relief under chapter 15 is not contingent upon a finding that any given foreign bankruptcy law or proceeding provides the same rights and protections to stakeholders that they are afforded under U.S. law. Instead, the inquiry is directed toward the "procedural fairness" of the foreign proceeding. Once that is established, a wide variety of relief is available under chapter 15 by way of assistance to the foreign representative and the foreign court.
PT Bakrie is a cautionary tale regarding the necessity of building an evidentiary record to support any relief requested in a chapter 15 case. In this instance, the foreign representative failed to do so but can likely renew his request with additional evidence regarding the need for non-debtor releases. Whether the focus will then shift to the unresolved voting rights dispute remains to be seen.
PT Bakrie also illustrates that the standard for approving nonconsensual third-party releases depends in many cases upon whether the debtor is in chapter 11 or chapter 15. Despite the outcome, the ruling suggests that the Southern District of New York is a preferred venue for foreign debtors wishing to grant such releases in their non-U.S. insolvency proceedings.
A version of this article is being published in Lexis Practical Guidance. It has been published here with permission.
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